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On Oct. 9, 2006, North Korea brazenly carried out a nuclear test in 
defiance of  the international community. The test reveals that long ago the 
DPRK’s leaders made a decision to develop and possess nuclear weapons. 
Having crossed the nuclear threshold, it is unlikely that Pyongyang will give 
up its possession of  such weapons. 
North Korea’s action was undoubtedly a challenge to the international 
community’s staunch opposition to nuclear proliferation. It has furthermore 
seriously damaged peace and stability in Northeast Asia. If  North Korea’s 
acquisition of  nuclear weapons is analyzed from the perspective of  the North 
Korean nuclear crisis as a process still underway as well as the result of  North 
Korea already a nuclear nation, we find that the degree of  cost and benefit 
differs for each of  the relevant parties. Regardless, however, China is the big-
gest loser.
 Zhang Liangui is professor of  international strategic research at the Party School 
of  the China Communist Party Central Committee. In 1968 he graduated from the 
Kim II Sung University in the Democratic People’s Republic of  Korea. He is an 
influential analyst and is considered one of  Beijing’s top North Korea experts.
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The North Korean move clearly runs counter to its own repeated promise 
to keep the Korean Peninsula free of  nuclear weapons and has crossed the red 
line set by the international community on the issue. Therefore, Pyongyang’s 
nuclear status is still reversible, and all concerned nations should continue to 
seek new methods to bring about denuclearization of  the Korean Peninsula. 
However, all available options have very difficult tradeoffs for China.
Lessons from the North Korean Nuclear Test 
The nuclear test conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of  Korea 
(DPRK), commonly known as North Korea, reveals that government leaders 
long ago made a decision to develop and possess nuclear weapons. Having 
made such a commitment, it is unlikely that they will give them up – not for 
anything. 
For a long period of  time there has been a theory that the North Korean 
claim to develop nuclear weapons was a bluff, that in fact, it had neither the 
desire nor the ability to carry it through. Later, the progress North Korea 
made in the field led to the theory that its development of  nuclear weapons 
aimed to discourage invasion, since the United States labeled it as part of  
the “axis of  evil” and threatened its security. It now seems clear that neither 
theory is necessarily accurate.
The impetus of  North Korea’s development of  nuclear weapons goes 
beyond the events of  the recent past. The development of  nuclear weapons 
is no trivial pursuit and data shows that the DPRK has been pursuing nuclear 
technology for decades.1 It requires great human ingenuity, massive material 
and financial resources, all underpinned by long-term sustained effort. In the 
late 1950s, North Korea signed two agreements with the Soviet Union for 
cooperation in nuclear technology. In the 1960s, it constructed the Yongbyon 
nuclear R&D complex and has been steadily advancing its nuclear program 
ever since. Despite having signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of  Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT) in the mid-1980s, the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of  
the Korean Peninsula with South Korea and the 1994 Agreed Framework between 
the USA and the DPRK, North Korea never stopped its nuclear program 
throughout this time.
North Korean resolve to possess nuclear weapons can be understood to 
have both an ‘ultimate objective’ and ‘process objectives’. Its ultimate objec-
tive is to master a powerful instrument in order to constrain the surrounding 
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big powers and work to transform its strategic relations with them. One only 
needs to carefully read the collection of  articles by the past two generations 
of  North Korean leaders to know that they believe North Korean history is 
replete with invasion and intervention by other powers. They even have their 
own explanation along this theme of  why China aided North Korea against 
American aggression. Given the perceived 
gap in its strength compared with the 
major powers, the mastery of  nuclear 
weapons was considered by North Korea 
to be an inevitable choice. 
In addition, nuclear weapons also serve 
to restore the strategic balance – even if  
only psychological – with South Korea. 
Since 1948, when the North and South 
states were founded, there has existed an acute struggle over inheritance of  
the Korean Peninsula. The balance of  comprehensive national strength began 
to tip in the early 1970s, and widened dramatically with the South’s economic 
power growing 30 times greater than the North. Frustrating the North is the 
fact that there is no conceivable reversal for the near future. North Korean 
leaders see mastering nuclear weapons as the only possible measure to dispel 
the fear of  failure in this competition and, even possibly to take the initiative 
in unifying the Korean Peninsula through force.
North Korea’s nuclear program was for a long period of  time a highly 
covert operation but once the program was exposed by the outside world, 
North Korea turned it into a tool for pursuing practical interests, thus gener-
ating a number of  ‘process objectives’: 
First, Pyongyang aims to use its nuclear program to meet domestic political 
needs. With a stagnant economy and worsening poverty of  its people, success-
ful tests provide them with an explanation since nuclear weapons are regarded 
as a symbol of  national strength and scientific and technological prowess. This 
can be seen in slogans like “military-first politics” and “construct a powerful 
country.” The nuclear program helps to stabilize society, eliminate feelings of  
failure and enhance the legitimacy of  the system.
Secondly, it can be used as leverage for seeking practical gains. The United 
States is the undisputed superpower in the modern world. North Korea is 
eager to break the ice and improve its relations with the United States, but 
has been given the cold shoulder. North Korean leaders feel that only by 
To constrain the 
surrounding big powers, 
North Korea’s ultimate 
objective is to master 
nuclear weapons.
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developing nuclear weapons is it possible to capture the attention of  the 
United States and hold bilateral talks because the United States cares most 
about nuclear proliferation. Meanwhile, North Korea can leverage its nuclear 
program to strengthen its hand in negotiations with the United States. When 
necessary, North Korea can make limited concessions (such as temporarily 
slowing down or freezing its nuclear program) in exchange for substantive 
economic benefits and diplomatic gains. 
The third objective is to prevent a U.S. invasion. North Korean leaders have 
always lacked confidence in their own security. The Iraq war thoroughly rein-
forced that notion. If  Saddam Hussein had nuclear weapons at his disposal, 
the United States would not have dared to attack and topple him – so the logic 
goes. This is why, after Baghdad was occupied in April 2003, North Korea 
broke away from its former tactic of  denial and began to openly declare its 
intention to develop nuclear weapons at 
every opportunity in a bid to discourage 
the United States from attacking it as 
well. 
Crossing the 
Nuclear Threshold
Throughout the past years of  nego-
tiations, North Korea has obscured its 
real intentions. In the hurly-burly of  
complex talks, Pyongyang has deluded 
all the concerned countries into believ-
ing that it could be persuaded to give up 
its nuclear program. In this way, North 
Korea has bought itself  more than a de-
cade, safely passing unscathed through 
the period of  tense security crisis, and 
successfully stepping over the nuclear 
threshold. 
Although North Korea had previ-
ously succeeded in mastering the 
technology for nuclear armaments, 
it had never conducted a nuclear test. 
《中国安全》季刊
征稿
《中国安全》季刊欢迎中美两国学
者、军界及政府官员、商界、科技
界及金融界人士的投稿。季刊每期
关注一个同中国未来走向紧密相关
的主题，同时接收深度分析中国安
全挑战的时政问题稿件。投稿须是
未发表的原创论文、为学者型深度
分析而非评论、须有引文出处的中
文或英文稿件。
投稿可由电子邮件发至：
publications@wsichina.org
或者邮寄至：
    
China Security
Editor 
China Program
World Security Institute
1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW
Washington, D.C. 20036
Coping With a Nuclear NK
6 China Security  Autumn  2006
Therefore, the military value of  its nuclear program was not only doubted 
by the outside world, it cast grave suspicion on North Korea. Consequently, 
North Korea had to fulfill two pressing tasks for its nuclear program. The 
one is to carry out a nuclear blast to verify its capability and possession of  
an atomic bomb, which was also needed to further design improvements 
in terms of  miniaturization and application. The other goal is to speed up 
the improvement of  its missile technology including short-range, medium-
range and long-range missiles to provide means of  delivery for its nuclear 
weapons.2
Both goals of  North Korea’s nuclear program were advanced with the 
test firing of  seven missiles of  a variety of  models on July 4 and the nuclear 
detonation on October 9 of  this year. The DPRK’s leaders have decided upon 
the possession of  nuclear weapons as its strategic policy, therefore the country 
will surely carry out more nuclear explosion tests in the future, indicating that 
North Korea has truly passed over the nuclear threshold. The denucleariza-
tion of  the Korean Peninsula has been forcefully shattered. 
Six-Party Talks Bogged Down
The effect of  this on the six-party talks is that they are now hopelessly 
bogged down with little chance of  resumption. Many countries are still calling 
to restart the talks but even if  North Korea agrees to return to the talks 
under current international pressure, another round will unlikely achieve any 
practical result. 
First of  all, the fate of  the six-party talks is ultimately due to the fact that 
the diplomatic objectives of  each side are perceived differently, leading to a 
number of  contradictions. North Korea has always stressed that the nuclear 
issue is a matter between it and the United States, and all the other countries 
that interfere are merely “third parties.” North Korea took part in the six-party 
talks because it was trying to find an opportunity and channel by which to 
become reconciled with the United States when bilateral talks were out of  the 
question. It also needed to play for time with the international community. 
When the six-party talks merely became a mechanism whereby to solve 
the North Korean nuclear issue through negotiations, as with this latest and 
longest battery of  talks beginning in August of  2003, they fundamentally 
became incongruent with North Korea’s interests. Being forced to discuss the 
topic it was most loath to discuss, namely, its denuclearization, it began tactics 
of  obfuscation.3
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That the five rounds of  six-party talks were carried through to five rounds 
speaks to the fact that both North Korea and the United States wanted to 
use them as a stalling technique to put off  a showdown between one another. 
By contrast, the other countries considered the six-party talks as a process, 
perhaps even the only process, to really resolve the problem. These differ-
ences ultimately made the talks a mere formality. 
Take for instance the dispute following the Phase I meetings of  the fifth 
round. The six-party talks came to a standstill ostensibly because of  the finan-
cial sanctions imposed on North Korea by the United States in October of  
2005, an act that North Korea claimed had ruined the atmosphere of  the talks. 
However, the real reason was that it eliminated the talks’ function of  delaying 
the showdown between North Korea and the United States. When the Joint 
Statement of  ‘material content’ was adopted at the conclusion of  the fourth 
round it directed the discussions for the 
fifth session toward specific measures for 
abandonment of  nuclear weapons, thus 
ending the stalling allowed by the “non-
substantive stage” of  the earlier rounds. 
It has been 15 years since the emer-
gence of  the North Korean nuclear issue 
and four years since the outbreak of  the 
second North Korean nuclear crisis. The reason that no showdown occurred 
during the period is that all the parties concerned needed the process to 
drag on. On the part of  North Korea, it needed to buy time to develop its 
weapons; on the part of  the United States, it believed that North Korea’s 
nuclear weapons were not a direct threat to it for the time being and it had 
more urgent issues to deal with, such as the Iranian nuclear issue. In addi-
tion, the United States also wanted to convince South Korea and China that 
the North Korean nuclear issue could not be solved through dialogue. South 
Korea had no alternative, fearing a war might ruin the progress of  decades 
of  its economic development. As for China and Russia, they believed that the 
development of  nuclear weapons by North Korea was just a bluff  and, even 
if  they were real, they would not constitute a threat to them and even, to the 
contrary, would be a card to play against the United States.
But things have irrevocably changed. Although North Korea may succumb 
to another form of  talks to replace the six-party talks, such as new three-party 
or four-party talks, under sufficient international pressure, their mandate will 
The DPRK has held the 
initiative while the big 
powers have taken a 
back seat.
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certainly not be accepted as a mere reinstatement of  the denuclearization of  
the Korean Peninsula, as hoped, but must be about new topics. North Korea 
will be speaking about nuclear disarmament in the capacity of  a “nuclear 
power” and will demand other nuclear powers to concede to reduction and 
disarmament requests before discussing North Korea’s nuclear situation. If  
they refuse, it can charge them with torpedoing the talks. It is also notewor-
thy, that any new talks will start from scratch, buying more time for North 
Korea.
All nations concerned must face facts: so far North Korea has held the 
initiative on the nuclear issue, while all the other big powers have been in the 
back seat. Until now, the fundamental needs and policy of  the United States, 
South Korea, China, Russia and Japan in the North Korean nuclear issue 
have remained unchanged. They want to keep up the current slow pace and 
continue the talks without setting deadlines. But the needs of  North Korea 
have changed.
In declaring itself  in possession of  nuclear weapons on Feb. 10, 2005, 
North Korea has transformed its position on the nuclear issue from one of  
“strategic defense” to one of  “strategic offense.” That is, North Korea is 
now no longer in defensive mode regarding its nuclear weapons program but 
will take the initiative to use it to achieve its strategic goals. This has signaled 
that the goal of  buying time in order to develop nuclear weapons has been 
fulfilled and the next task is to force the international community to accept 
it as a nuclear power. In this way, the pacification attitude of  the concerned 
countries toward the issue of  nuclear proliferation will completely transform 
into a concrete policy. The specific approach of  North Korea is to exploit 
those countries that fear a showdown or war to engage in explicit high-profile 
publicity, brandish its nuclear capabilities, deprive these countries of  excuses 
for making a choice and give them an ultimatum: accept the facts and rec-
ognize North Korea’s nuclear power status, or persist in their anti-nuclear 
proliferation stand, which means war. They must make a choice, without any 
further delay. 
Consequences for the Six Parties
Undoubtedly, failure of  the denuclearization of  the Korean Peninsula 
is absolutely detrimental to all countries and peoples, including the North 
Korean people. However, if  we analyze the nuclearization of  North Korea 
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from two aspects: process (North Korean nuclear crisis is still underway) and 
result (North Korea has already become a nuclear country), then we find that 
the degree of  cost and benefit differs for each of  the relevant parties. 
First and foremost, the consequences of  DPRK nuclearization have been 
detrimental in all respects for the North Korean people. By devoting colos-
sal human, material and financial resources to the development of  nuclear 
weapons, North Korea will definitely exacerbate the problems of  its mired 
economy and poor living standards. An 
extra burden will come with the annual 
cost of  safety maintenance of  the nuclear 
weapons. In addition, the narrow Korean 
Peninsula is densely populated, with 70 
million people living on 220 thousand 
square miles. This is a land intended for 
habitation, not testing atomic bombs. For 
instance, in such a heavily-populated area, 
where would North Korean citizens go in the event of  a nuclear accident 
during a test? North Korea would certainly face stern condemnation and 
sanctions of  the international community for its disregard of  the universal 
opposition to nuclear weapons and become even more isolated in the world. 
Its economy would have no hope of  recovery and the lives of  its people 
would become even more difficult. In addition, nuclear weapons will not 
increase North Korea’s security. Rather, they will put North Korea in an even 
more dangerous position. The United States may detest the present DPRK 
government but it would have no need to attack a non-nuclear North Korea. 
On the other hand, a nuclearized North Korea automatically upgrades the 
country as a target of  U.S. nuclear attack and seriously raises the possibility 
of  preemptive strike. With North Korea’s relatively small territory and lack 
of  ‘strategic depth’, maintaining a strategic force necessary for second-strike 
capability, and thereby providing mutual deterrence with the United States, is 
highly unlikely. 
At the process level, the biggest winner (other than the North Korean 
government) is Japan. For a long time, the right wing in Japan has tried to 
revise the pacifist nature of  its constitution and push the country toward 
rearmament. Although this has so far been blocked by opposition among 
the Japanese public, the North Korean missile launches and nuclear test have 
done the political right a big favor. The Japanese view of  rearmament has 
Japan would in one 
stroke become a nuclear 
power and a central 
force in a new East Asian 
military alliance.
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shifted as most now truly feel that Japan is being threatened by North Korea 
and that they have no choice but to strengthen its defense capabilities. Against 
such a background, the Japanese right wing is preparing a revision of  the con-
stitution to turn its Self  Defense Force into a conventional military.4 Under 
the pretext of  guarding against North Korean missiles, Japan has sharply in-
creased its military spending, set up the missile defense system in cooperation 
with the United States, launched several reconnaissance satellites, expanded 
the maritime combat force, drawn up a strategy for a preemptive strike and 
strengthened the Japanese-American alliance, thereby accomplishing a long-
held wish.5 Furthermore, according to Japanese media coverage dated May 22, 
2005, a report from the U.S. Senate Republican Policy Committee claimed that 
if  China continued its ambiguous policies on the North Korean nuclear issue 
then the United States would encourage Japan to become nuclearized and 
turn “Japanese nuclear weapons” against “North Korean nuclear weapons.”6 
It would also organize an “alliance system” that included Taiwan, Australia, 
South Korea, Japan and other Southeast Asian countries and regions.7  In this 
way, Japan would in one stroke become a nuclear power and a central force in 
a new East Asian military alliance. 
At the process level, the United States will roughly receive equal losses and 
benefits. The benefits include opportunities to adjust its military deployment 
by leveraging the North Korean nuclear crisis and strengthening its military 
presence in East Asia; curbing the centrifugal tendencies of  South Korea and 
Japan and cementing its alliances with each country respectively; increasing 
military equipment sales in the region; reaping economic gains; and further 
isolating and punishing the DPRK to weaken the regime of  Kim Jong Il. The 
losses are significant as well. By developing nuclear weapons, North Korea has 
challenged the authority of  the NPT and broken the existing nuclear order, 
which may trigger a loss of  control over nuclear proliferation and constitute a 
threat to the hegemonic interests of  the United States. North Korea’s nuclear 
tests have also destabilized the regional security environment, which could 
lead to unknown negative consequences for American interests in East Asia. 
At the process level, the losses for China far outweigh any gains. Since 
China is in strategic competition with the United States and Japan, their gains, 
as set out above, are China’s losses. To make matters worse, some of  their 
losses are also losses for China. This latter category would include nuclear 
proliferation and the consequent instability in East Asia. In short, the losses 
for China are mainly manifested in a rapidly deteriorating regional security 
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environment. Furthermore, China is caught in a difficult bind. On the one 
hand, since a North Korea with nuclear weapons is not in China’s interests 
or the common interests of  humankind, as a responsible major power, China 
must take a clear stand of  opposition. Otherwise, its international image and 
prestige will be severely tarnished. Even an ambiguous attitude will result in 
China being isolated and denounced by the international community. On the 
other hand, unequivocal opposition from China toward the DPRK is bound 
to cause vicious reprisal from North Korea, certainly leading to changes to 
Sino-DPRK relations. China is cornered diplomatically. Merely, the gains 
are that the North Korean nuclear issue will have temporarily occupied and 
restrained the United States and perhaps also that China will have added to 
its diplomatic credentials as mediator and participant in the Six Party Talks. 
China’s losses are wide-ranging and permanent, while its gains are conditional, 
transient and full of  risks. 
If  only the ‘result’ of  the North Korean nuclear tests is observed and not 
the costs and benefits of  the ‘process’ of  their development then all are losers. 
Starkly put, the reality is that North Korea has come to own nuclear weapons 
without suffering mortal punishment. From a geopolitical perspective, Japan 
will be the primary target of  North Korean nuclear weapons, exposing Japan 
to its gravest security threat since the end of  World War II. Japan has no 
alternative but to intensify its theater missile defense plan, reinforce coastal 
defense, beef  up its reconnaissance forces and develop its own nuclear weap-
ons to form mutual deterrence.
In South Korea, some politicians privately believe that a North Korea with 
nuclear weapons is not necessarily a bad thing for the South, as these weapons 
will come into South Korea’s possession when the two sides are reunited. 
This is erroneous thinking. With nuclear weapons in its hands, North Korea 
will be even more obstreperous regarding the contentious outstanding issues 
between the North and South. South Korea has no way to contend with the 
North’s strong position. As a result of  these developments, the balance of  
forces between the North and South will be even more skewed in the North’s 
favor, resulting in South Korea becoming hostage to North Korea.
For the United States, the losses as a result of  North Korean nuclear weap-
ons capability are obvious. Although they will not constitute a direct threat to 
United States territory in the short term, Americans will live in constant fear 
if  North Korea pursues nuclear proliferation by selling its nuclear technol-
ogy, nuclear materials and even atomic bombs to the Middle East or terror-
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ist groups. North Korea’s successful crossing of  the nuclear threshold will 
certainly have a demonstrative effect among the number of  nations harboring 
nuclear ambitions, invariably leading to grave harm to international law and 
the existing nonproliferation system. As leader of  the current international 
order, the United States’ authority and power will be severely damaged. 
From the perspective of  the outcome of  a nuclear North Korea, the biggest 
loser is, again, China. Similar to the United States and other countries, nuclear 
proliferation is also very bad for China, and will pressure Japan, South Korea 
and even Taiwan toward arming themselves with nuclear weapons, causing a 
dangerous nuclear arms race in East Asia. This would degrade China’s security 
environment to an unprecedented level. The so-called “nuclear peace” as de-
scribed by some scholars is unrealistic because nuclear proliferation on a wide 
scale will lead to a loss of  control of  the international security environment 
as the probability of  irrational decision-making and the occurrence of  nuclear 
accidents increase. To ensure the absolute safety of  nuclear weapons and the 
authority of  the NPT, China will persist in 
its diplomatic policy of  “opposing nuclear 
proliferation.” 
Second, North Korean possession of  
nuclear weapons may push China into a 
new security dilemma in Northeast Asia. 
For a long time, in Chinese strategic thinking, the American military presence 
in Northeast Asia has been a latent threat to China’s national security. Yet, it 
is because of  the U.S. protective nuclear umbrella that Japan has exercised 
self-control in terms of  developing nuclear weapons. But with North Korea’s 
possession of  nuclear weapons, only through U.S. military presence and 
nuclear deterrence in Northeast Asia will Japan (and possibly South Korea and 
Taiwan) possibly be dissuaded from developing nuclear weapons themselves in 
the foreseeable future. China would then be in a position of  having to choose 
between two unfavorable alternatives: accepting Japan and South Korea with 
their own nuclear weapons or cementing a high-profile U.S. military presence 
in Northeast Asia. 
Third, although North Korean nuclear weapons are not directed at China, 
no one can be sure how things may turn out in five or ten years. The lesson of  
Vietnam should not be forgotten. The political and economic center of  China 
is on the eastern coastal areas, which are adjacent to North Korea. If, in the 
future, North Korea uses its nuclear weapons to threaten or blackmail China 
China is the biggest 
loser with a nuclear 
North Korea.
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or has a nuclear accident due to a loss or loss of  control, the consequences 
for China will be dire. 
Options for the International Community 
Now that North Korea has conducted a nuclear test, the concerned nations 
must respond. Before any countermeasures are taken, however, an important 
judgment must be made that will strongly bear on the options ahead and the 
countermeasures to be taken: Is it possible for North Korea to retreat from 
its nuclear position? That is, can the Korean Peninsula return to a non-nuclear 
status? 
If  it is agreed that the North Korean nuclear issue is irreversible, the con-
clusion is naturally that we must accept the reality, admit that the previous 
efforts at denuclearization of  the Korean Peninsula have failed and recognize 
North Korea as a nuclear country. Logically, what should be considered then 
is not how to eliminate North Korea’s nuclear weapons, but how to coexist 
with a nuclear-armed North Korea. If  North Korean nuclearization is judged 
to still be reversible, then concerned nations should continue to seek new 
methods to bring about denuclearization of  the Korean Peninsula. 
The first judgment is defeatist. Through a concerted effort, the denucle-
arization of  the Korean Peninsula can and must be resumed. The alternative 
will be too high a price for humanity. Therefore, the second judgment is the 
only option, and whether or not this ideal can be reached will be entirely 
dependent on human effort and imagination. This is why we need to advance 
the discussion. 
Theoretically, there are a number of  possible solutions to the North Korean 
nuclear issue. The first possibility is a peaceful solution based on negotiations. 
This would mean North Korea returning to the six-party talks to reach agree-
ment through negotiation. In this scenario, North Korea would give up its 
nuclear weapons program for sufficient compensation that is also acceptable 
to the international community. Denuclearization of  the Korean Peninsula 
would be realized through an implementation process, where the nuclear 
weapons, facilities and materials would be transported outside the country and 
destroyed. This is naturally the best solution, for it is a peaceful one and based 
on dialogue and mediation that entails the lowest cost, minimum of  risk and 
would be an open process that can curtail any secret deal. On the one hand, 
the participation of  multiple parties in a negotiation process increases the 
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chances for reaching agreement. However, they are also complex and drawn 
out, and would give North Korea more time to further strengthen its nuclear 
arsenal, which could have the opposite effect of  undermining the talks. 
The second possibility is a solution based on the use of  force. Obviously, 
under this scenario, the six-party talks would be dead. The UN Security Council 
would pass a resolution to intensify sanctions against North Korea. During 
the act of  enforcing it, an armed conflict led by the United States, and/or a 
multinational force, would break out by launching military strikes at North 
Korea, topple its existing regime and take control of  its nuclear facilities, which 
are then transported abroad to be destroyed. Although the solution could 
instantly and thoroughly restore denuclearization of  the Korean Peninsula, 
it may cause enormous loss of  life and property resulting in a turbulent and 
chaotic security environment for years to come. 
The third possibility is that the United States secretly interferes in the inter-
nal affairs of  North Korea creating dramatic changes in the political situation. 
This method could quickly and thoroughly restore the non-nuclear status of  
the Korean Peninsula without triggering excessive turmoil or casualties. But, 
from the perspective of  legal principles, this is not an aboveboard solution 
and could have serious consequences if  the situation got out of  control dur-
ing implementation. 
The fourth possibility is where the United States independently reaches a 
compromise with North Korea through a clandestine deal. This is an option 
the United States might resort to in order to punish China and Russia if  they 
continued to resolutely oppose the wishes of  the United States to use force 
against a North Korea -- with whom a negotiated deal through peaceful talks 
is considered very difficult. This would be a deal whereby North Korea prom-
ises not to pursue nuclear proliferation and, while the United States tolerates 
the nuclear status of  North Korea, it would encourage Japan, South Korea 
and even Taiwan to develop nuclear weapons. For China, this is a worst case 
outcome. 
China’s Difficult Tradeoffs
In terms of  the Korean Peninsula, China’s core interests are two-fold: to 
realize the denuclearization of  the Korean Peninsula and ensure that North 
Korea remains a friendly neighbor. Therefore, a peacefully negotiated solution 
to the North Korea nuclear issue is naturally the optimal choice for China; 
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however, such a solution is highly dependent on North Korea’s attitude. If  
the six-party platform resumes, what conditions will a nuclear North Korea 
raise during the talks? This is completely unknown by all. On Sept. 16, prior 
to the nuclear test, Kim Yong Nam, the number two figure in North Korea, 
indicated that “the preconditions for giving up its nuclear weapons is that 
neighboring countries should also discontinue their nuclear programs and 
that the big powers should realize nuclear disarmament.”8  It can be inferred 
from his remarks that after returning to the six-party talks, North Korea is 
very likely to take nuclear disarmament of  the big powers as a precondition 
for abandoning its own nuclear weapons. 
This will effectively render progress in the 
talks impossible. 
If  it is impossible to achieve the goal 
of  a denuclearized Korean Peninsula, a 
force-based solution authorized by the 
Security Council seems the second-best 
option for China. Not only would such 
a solution instantly achieve the goal of  a denuclearized peninsula, it could 
be under a unanimous decision of  the Security Council member countries, 
which would be open and transparent and take into account the interests of  
all. But the North Korea nuclear issue is hard to measure purely from the 
angle of  interests. The opposition to the use of  force in solving disputes has 
always been a distinct feature of  China’s diplomacy, and it would be almost 
impossible to give up its habitual stance at a session of  the Security Council in 
favor of  a draft resolution that supports the use of  force. Only after a major 
breakthrough in its own diplomatic policy would China be likely to support 
the Security Council in using force to solve the North Korea nuclear weapons 
issue. 
The third possible solution to the North Korea nuclear issue is that the 
United States catalyzes a transformation of  political power inside North 
Korea. Although it would achieve denuclearization, such a clandestine solu-
tion would involve many trade-offs that would not be brought into the open. 
Under such a scenario, it is very possible that with a presence in North Korea, 
the power of  the United States would be significantly bolstered and bring 
even greater harm to Chinese interests. Some Western scholars speculate 
about whether China will meddle in the internal affairs of  North Korea and 
support a pro-China faction. Such speculations are entirely groundless. First, 
The worst outcome for 
China would be a 
secret American-
North Korea deal.
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it is a fundamental diplomatic principle of  China to not intervene in the 
internal affairs of  other countries, let alone incite a coup in another country. 
Furthermore, there is no so-called “pro-China faction” in North Korea. What 
North Korea has established is an “exclusive ideological system.” As early as 
the 1950s, North Korea purged the influence of  the “Yan’an faction.”9
However, for China, the worst outcome of  the North Korean nuclear issue 
would be a secret American-North Korea deal. Such a solution could hinder 
both the goal of  denuclearization and would not ensure that North Korea 
remains a friendly neighbor of  China. Of  course, such a situation depends 
highly on how North Korea and the United States judge each other and the 
necessity of  major adjustments in their policies toward one another.
Conclusion
Since the North Korean nuclear test, the relationship between China and 
North Korea is no longer the same. First, a nuclearized North Korea will have 
a greater advantage in bilateral relations with China, and it will be difficult for 
China to anticipate, let alone influence, its next move. A nuclearized North 
Korea will bring countless problems to China’s politics and its diplomacy. 
Second, although the Sino-Korean Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual 
Assistance contains provisions on a military alliance, China has no wish to 
be dragged into a war and will decide whether or not the provisions therein 
regarding military aid should be implemented based on the specific circum-
stances. Lastly, many Western scholars presume that China is unwilling to see 
North Korea collapse because it would have to deal with the issue of  North 
Korean refugees. Although the refugee issue might have an impact on China, 
it is certainly not China’s main concern. China’s aim on the Peninsula will be 
to avoid a humanitarian disaster in North Korea. But the heavier burden of  
a flood of  refugees resulting from collapse of  the North would fall on South 
Korea rather than China. China has a vast territory and even millions of  refu-
gees would not have a huge impact on its economy. Besides, the international 
community would also help to mitigate the humanitarian consequences.
A nuclear North Korea has not only strained Sino-North Korean relations, 
but could also put to the test the Sino-American relationship. The Security 
Council Resolution 1718, adopted on Oct. 14, 2006, excludes military sanctions 
as an option, though it contains wordings like “in accordance with Chapter 
7 of  the U.N. Charter.” This was perhaps a necessary and wise compromise 
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made between all parties, but as such, it disqualifies UN sanctions as a viable 
standalone option for solving the North Korean nuclear issue. Those who 
understand the North Korean style of  doing things know that no economic 
and political sanctions will suffice to bring North Korea back to the six-party 
talks, let alone give up its nuclear weapons. On the contrary, it will respond in 
an even more vehement manner. This is what they call “fighting fire with fire.” 
Therefore, following a period of  implementation of  Resolution 1718, little 
will change and the same old question will reemerge: accept North Korea as 
a nuclear country and bear the consequences, or persist in the non-nuclear 
state of  the Korean Peninsula and take relevant measures. This choice must 
be made. 
If  further talks prove futile, China and the United States will certainly 
greatly differ as to whether the Security Council should try to resolve the 
North Korean nuclear issue through the use of  force. China’s diplomatic 
stand has consistently been to oppose force as a basis for taking action against 
another country. This stance will be strongly challenged in the process of  
deciding what to do about North Korea. In addition, the following ques-
tion will surely be posed: “Who should be held accountable for North Korea 
developing nuclear weapons?” The gap between the United States and China’s 
approaches and interests could turn the North Korean nuclear issue into a 
point of  serious contention between the two countries. This is the last thing 
the Chinese want to see but both sides should be prepared, cracking this nut 
may be a long time in coming.
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